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ABSTRACT: This article proposes an alternative categorization of the populist phenomena, by elaborating 
the distinction between electoral-delegative and participative-mobilising populisms. All the populist phe-
nomena share some common traits, such as a polarising and antagonist discourse dividing the society 
into a “People” and some “elites” or privileged sectors, their reliance on a strong leadership, a pretension 
to be majoritarian and to achieve the power at the national level in order to restore the sovereignty of 
the People. Nonetheless, the strategies for achieving these goals vary according to the specific diagnoses 
that would correct the perceived deficiencies of the representative democracies in terms of accountabil-
ity of the representatives. The populisms closer to the electoral-delegative pole stress the symbolic di-
mension of the concept of representation, thus relying on a strong leader able to “truly interpret” the 
general will of the People. Those closer to the participative-mobilising pole call for an active involvement 
of the People in the decision-making process in order to effectively control the public institutions, stress-
ing the descriptive dimension of the concept of representation and sometimes questioning the theoreti-
cal bases sustaining the representative democracy. I provide a brief discussion on four participative-mo-
bilising populist experiences, i.e. the MAS-IPSP, the Kirchnerism, the M5S and Podemos, focusing on their 
internal organizations and relying on an extensive fieldwork (consisting in one hundred in-depth inter-
views with country experts and party’s representatives at regional and national levels) that I conducted 
for a broader research project. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
This article proposes an alternative categorization of the populist phenomena, by 
elaborating the distinction between electoral-delegative and participative-mobilising 
populisms. All the populist phenomena share some common traits, such as a polarising 
and antagonist discourse dividing the society into a “People” and some “elites” or privi-
leged sectors, their reliance on a strong leadership, a pretension to be majoritarian and 
to achieve the power at the national level in order to restore the sovereignty of the Peo-
ple. Nonetheless, the strategies for achieving these goals vary according to the specific 
diagnoses that would correct the perceived deficiencies of the representative democra-
cies in terms of accountability of the representatives. The populisms closer to the elec-
toral-delegative pole stress the symbolic dimension of the concept of representation, 
thus relying on a strong leader able to “truly interpret” the general will of the People. 
Those closer to the participative-mobilising pole call for an active involvement of the 
People in the decision-making process in order to effectively control the public institu-
tions, stressing the descriptive dimension of the concept of representation and some-
times questioning the theoretical bases sustaining the representative democracy.  
The article is divided into six sections. In the first section I show how the different 
theoretical approaches on populism tend to be skewed towards one of the two poles I 
mentioned above. In the second section, I discuss the populist understandings of the 
concept of representation, arguing that populisms are even more interested in the input 
than in the output side of representative democracy. In the third and the fourth sections, 
I sketch the different characteristics of the electoral-delegative and participative-mobi-
lising populisms. Then I provide a brief discussion on four participative-mobilising popu-
list experiences, i.e. the Bolivian MAS-IPSP, Argentine Kirchnerism, the M5S and Po-
demos, focusing on their internal organizations and relying on an extensive fieldwork 
(consisting in one hundred in-depth interviews with country experts and party’s repre-
sentatives at regional and national levels) that I conducted for a broader research pro-
ject. In the concluding section, I briefly discuss both how the two populist forms pursue 
different re-politicising projects and the different understandings of the concept of Peo-
ple in the Latin American and Southern European experiences described in the fifth sec-
tion. 
 
 
1 This research has been partially supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Chile, through 
the grant CONICYT-PCHA/Doctorado Nacional/2015-21151414, and by the Chilean Núcleo Milenio. I would 
also like to show my gratitude to Pierre Ostiguy, who offered valuable comments that improved the manu-
script. 
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2. Looking at different concepts? A review of Populism Theories 
 
Populism is an essentially contested concept that has attracted a vast and growing 
theoretical and empirical research. In a valuable literature review of the theoretical de-
bate on this concept, Gidrow and Bonikowski (2013) identified three different ap-
proaches, i.e. populism as a “political ideology”, a “political style” and a “political strat-
egy”. I will instead rely on a slightly different categorization: populism as an “ideology or 
discourse” (e.g., Mudde 2004; Aslanidis 2016); populism as a “strategy” (e.g., Weyland 
2001); populism as a “logic or a political project” (e.g., Laclau 2005a; Jansen 2011; Collins 
2014) and populism as a “political-cultural style” (e.g., Ostiguy, 2009, 2017; Moffit and 
Torney 2013). All these approaches, focusing on different features of the populist phe-
nomena, present some strengths and weaknesses. I argue that the first two approaches 
are better suited to describe what I will call delegative populisms, while the third one 
derives from an understanding of populism as a participative, mobilising phenomenon. 
The fourth approach, focusing on the peculiar “populist way of representing”, is useful 
to understand both the subtypes I propose in this paper, although it also seems skewed 
towards a “delegative” interpretation. 
Probably, Cas Mudde provides the most widespread definition of populism: “an ide-
ology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and an-
tagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that pol-
itics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 
2004, 543). The conception of populism as an ideology (a “set of loosely interrelated 
ideas”) has been defended for its clarity and easy operationalization (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2013; Aslanidis 2016), and in fact has been used for several empirical re-
searches (e.g., Pauwels 2011; Akkerman et al. 2014).  
Other scholars (e.g., Caiani and Della Porta, 2011; Aslanidis, 2016) have preferred con-
sidering it as a “rhetoric”, a “discourse” or a “frame”, i.e. a “’schemata of interpretation’ 
that allow their users ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ complex events taking place 
in daily life” (Goffman 1974, 21), providing “a diagnosis by identifying ‘some event or 
aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration’, then proceed to suggest a 
prognosis, ‘a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to 
be done’ and conclude by circulating a motivational urgency to take corrective action” 
(Snow and Benford 1988, 199). While this approach is quite complementary to the “ide-
ological” one (see Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016), it has the merit of stressing 
the “diagnosis-prognosis scheme” implicit in the populist phenomena, which, as I argued 
elsewhere (Padoan, 2016), are likely to emerge as a reaction to some “pathologies” suf-
fered by national representative democracies.  
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Mudde complements his definition identifying also the conceptual opposites of pop-
ulism: elitism and pluralism. If elitism “believe that the people are dishonest and vulgar, 
while the elite are superior in cultural, intellectual and moral terms”, pluralism “assumes 
that societies are composed of several social groups with different ideas and interests” 
and “takes for granted that it is impossible to generate something like a ‘general will’ of 
the people”, as “the term ‘‘pluralism’’ has increasingly been used to refer . . . to ethnic, 
cultural, or religious groups, usually in a fashion that advocates wide latitude for such 
minorities to be able to pursue their own specific traditions and ways of life” (Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).  
The problem, here, is that Mudde conflates “populism” with “holism” or “organicism”. 
He states that “whereas pluralism appreciates societal divisions and sees politics as ‘the 
art of compromise,’ populism (and elitism) discards societal divisions, denounces social 
groups as ‘special interests,’ and rejects compromise as defeat” (Mudde, 2013). In my 
view, Mudde goes too far: I agree with the potential (but not at all necessary) incompat-
ibility between populism and specific groups defending their rights or interests, but this 
happens only when the ‘special interests’ are depicted as ‘privileges’ enjoyed by an ill-
defined “elite”. The complete dissolution of the different social or cultural sectors into a 
homogeneous “People” is not unavoidable.  
The “ideological approach” is probably too much focused on the analysis of the pop-
ulist right-wing parties in Western Europe. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013), in order 
to make their approach more adherent to other political realities, elaborated the distinc-
tion between “inclusionary” and “exclusionary populisms”, according to three dimen-
sions: material, political and symbolic. Nonetheless, there is a perfect coincidence be-
tween “left-wing” and “inclusionary” populisms (and between “right-wing” and “exclu-
sionary” ones); moreover, the authors considered the Bolivian MAS as a “prototype” of 
the inclusionary populism. But if ‘‘pluralism’’ has increasingly been used to refer . . . to 
ethnic, cultural, or religious groups, usually in a fashion that advocates wide latitude for 
such minorities to be able to pursue their own specific traditions and ways of life” (Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), it is very difficult to apply Mudde’s definition to a party 
claiming for the defence of the indigenous peoples’ rights (rhetorically at least). Even 
more striking is the contrast between Mudde’s definition and a party such as Podemos, 
which has made of plurinationalism and the empowerment of the ethnic minorities (in-
cluding Roma people and migrants) two important “flags”. In my view, the relationship 
between “populism” and “pluralism” is highly undertheorized. 
Weyland advances another influential definition, arguing that “populism is best de-
fined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises gov-
ernment power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large 
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numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (2001, 14). According to this definition, pop-
ulism is almost all about manipulation and a top-down relationship, leaving no space for 
a more complex analysis of the “tools” that “the people” have in order to influence the 
leader’s actions (see also Ostiguy 2017).  
This weakness emerges because even the Weyland’s “strategic” approach is highly 
context-driven, as this scholar had in mind the Latin American “neo-populists” (such as 
Menem, Fujimori, Collor or, at the other side of the left-right axis, Chávez) emerged dur-
ing the Nineties. Weyland tends to see in the People a sort of undistinguished “mob”, 
which would fall apart in the absence of an articulating leader. This contrasts with the 
Latin American “classic populisms” such as Perón and Vargas, who led the processes of 
corporatist incorporation of the organized working class into the polity domain, deci-
sively strengthening the union organizations and building the strongest mass-parties of 
the entire continent (Collier and Collier, 1991). More recently, the rise of the Bolivian 
MAS-IPSP is precisely the apex of a process fuelled by the progressive empowerment of 
the peasant unions.  
Nonetheless, Weyland does point to a crucial, and often overlooked, issue: the eternal 
search of power and of the occupation of the state institutions by populist leaders and 
movements. Other scholars such as Canovan (1999), with her distinction between the 
“pragmatic” and “redemptive” faces of democracy (the latter being proper of popu-
lisms), and Laclau (2005a), who theorizes populism as a “counter-hegemonic process” in 
order to achieve the power, help stressing this feature. It is common to equate populism 
with “demagoguery”, the tendency to promise something impossible to deliver. Popu-
lism has been portrayed as the “art of blame-shifting”, through the identification of an 
ill-defined “elite” as the origin of social and economic problems, in order to justify its 
own governmental failures (Vasilopolou et al., 2014). If the liberal critics point to the 
Manichean and simplistic populist Weltanschauung, several leftist thinkers instead tend 
to consider the populists as unable to address the structural causes of the socioeconomic 
problems. Nonetheless, the “blame-shifting” strategy is by no means a prerogative of 
populists (Weaver, 1986), acting also as a mechanism to build strong collective identities 
based on an antagonist Other. Moreover, the “counter-hegemonic populist potential” 
displays all its strength precisely by broadening the “horizon of the possibilities”, allow-
ing for a wider discussion of the policy options available. 
In fact, Weyland’s main concern is for the populist tendency to “deliver too much” to 
its people, to implement unsustainable social and economic policies (Pribble, 2013), but 
also to weaken the institutional controls and to steer democracy towards unpredictable 
and authoritarian directions (O’Donnell, 1994). Weyland, thus, is fully conscious of the 
populist anti-status quo potential. 
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Laclau (2005a) offers a dynamic interpretation of the concept, conceiving it as a polit-
ical logic challenging the existing institutions, through the articulation of different “un-
satisfied” (and sometimes unexpressed) demands around an “empty signifier” able to 
condense a “chain of equivalence” between these demands. He argues that “a move-
ment is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual contents identi-
fiable as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of articulation of those con-
tents – whatever those contents are” (Laclau, 2005b: 33). This marks a strong difference 
with class or issue-based political projects. For example, Jansen (2011: 84) recognizes 
that “In characterizing such a broad swath of ‘popular’ society, leaders downplay differ-
ences and emphasize similarities (or at least unity through functional interdependence). 
In this respect, populist rhetoric differs from class-based, interest group, or issue-specific 
rhetoric”.  
However, Jansen also adds that “Suggesting that populist politics is about leaders mo-
bilizing supporters undermines organicist assumptions that populist movements embody 
some natural confluence of the interests of — or symbiotic relationships between — pre-
political social groups (Jansen 2011: 85). This means that the process of “building a peo-
ple” surely implies a rearticulation of the main demands advanced by different social 
categories. However, this cannot imply that these demands (and the eventual related 
collective identities) will disappear during this process, nor that the internal relations 
within the “populist coalition” are exempt of tensions and completely solved by the 
leader’s interpretation of the general will. 
Relying on the Laclausian approach, authors such as Jansen or Collins (2014) focus on 
the strategies used in order to “build a people”. All of them stress the process of con-
struction of a new collective identity, able to subsume (without deleting) the previous 
identities and the interests (or, in the Laclau’s jargon, “unsatisfied claims”) carried on by 
the different actors and sectors that join the populist project.  The definition of populism 
as a mobilising project, as both the authors do, implies that the “instrumental”, agential 
and strategic element stressed by Weyland coexist with the contra-hegemonic and “re-
demptive” aspects underscored by Laclau and Canovan. 
Mouffe (2000) even argues that populism should be read as the result of the irrecon-
cilable tension between democracy and liberalism (see also Pappas 2012). Populism is 
clearly skewed towards the former, thus contributing to the building of an “agonist” de-
mocracy, in which there is little space left to compromise (and technocratic solutions), 
seen as intrinsically undemocratic. An “agonist democracy” relies on the belief that the 
social conflicts cannot be subjected to a “best” or “optimal” solution: conflict is politics, 
and politics is necessary for democracy. The populist logic, articulating the society into 
two camps, becomes the precondition for politics, it would be constitutive of it.  
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As neoliberalism can easily be read as a project aiming at “depoliticizing” the society, 
claiming for the free market as the most efficient solution to social conflicts (something 
that represents, of course, a very political operation) and for a “technocratic” way to 
govern, not only the possibilities of populism to emerge, but also the benign, democratic 
potential of populism are fully displayed.  
Nonetheless, the Latin American “neopopulisms” of the Nineties (and, in Western Eu-
rope, Berlusconi), advancing a neoliberal policy agenda, represent a challenge for these 
“progressive” understandings of populism. In contrast with the “antineoliberal popu-
lists” analysed in the fifth section, they generally presented themselves as leaders gov-
erning according to an “ordinary common sense”, fighting the “over-politicization” of 
the society – due to an “incompetent political class”, which provoked social and eco-
nomic negative consequences. It would be difficult to interpret these phenomena as at-
tempts to “re-politicize” their democracies, although the polarization they provoked 
surely contributed to create a conflictive political climate.  
In conclusion, the interpretation of populism as a logic, or as a mobilising political pro-
ject, has the merit of being very attentive to the populist process of articulation of pop-
ular demands and to fruitfully stress the “counter-hegemonic” potential of populism. 
Nonetheless, it probably exaggerates when considering populism as constitutive of poli-
tics, overlooking that populism can also serve as a mechanism for “freezing” a highly-
ideologized society. 
 
 
3. The Populist Understanding of the Concept of “Representation”: Accounta-
bility and Popular Sovereignty 
 
The three approaches discussed above barely mention the most “visible” features of 
the populist phenomena: the “picturesque”, expressive forms that populist leaders and 
supporters assume, often in order to highlight their antagonism against the “élite”. In 
contrast, several scholars consider them much more than a mere “epiphenomenon” of 
the populisms. They understand populism as a “political style”, the “repertoires of per-
formance that are used to create political relations” (Moffitt and Tormey 2013, 7). Ac-
cording to these authors, the populist style is characterized by three main features: the 
“appeal to the People”, the “perception of a crisis, breakdown or a threat” to the People 
and the use of “bad manners” (Ostiguy, 2009), a “disregard for appropriate ways of act-
ing in the political realm” (Moffitt and Tormey 2013, 12).  
The “stylistic” approach problematizes the relationship between the leader and the 
People, stressing how the “performances” of the former are not addressed to a “passive” 
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audience: instead, there is a “feedback loop” between the leader and the followers, who 
keep a crucial influence on the former’s actions (Moffitt and Tormey 2013, 9). According 
to Ostiguy (2017), populism is better understood as a “form of relationship between the 
“people” and a leader”, along two broad congruent dimensions. In the concept of popu-
lism coexist a socio-cultural dimension (referring to the “plebeian” and often vulgar ex-
pressive forms, functional to reinforce the frontier against the “elites” and the “privi-
leged sectors”) and a political-cultural one, which tends to reject the “formalisms” of the 
“polite”, institutional forms of managing politics, which would prevent the “true People” 
from being heard by the legitimate authority. This approach helps to problematize the 
issue of the populist understandings of the concept of representation.  
Following Pitkin (1967), this concept is semantically complex. “Representation” can 
be intended a) in a formalistic way (someone is authorized to act for somebody else); b) 
in a descriptive way (the representatives must be similar to the represented); c) in a sym-
bolic way (the representatives symbolize the represented, by “subsuming” the main 
characteristics of the latters); d) in the sense of “acting in behalf of”, by pursuing the 
concrete interests of the represented. The complexity increases due to the further divi-
sion between the theories stressing, alternatively, the concepts of “authority” or of “ac-
countability” as constitutive dimensions of the concept of “representation”. “Represent-
ing” someone implies to have the authority to do that; however, for the “accountability” 
theorists, in the absence of some (meaningful) mechanism of accountability, there is no 
possible kind of representation. 
As Ostiguy (2014, 20) argues, populism is “a way to shorten the distances between the 
legitimate authority and the people”: this goal can be pursued through very different 
strategies. It is not always true that populism suggests “a correction [of democracy] 
based on enhanced accountability rather than increased participation” (Barr 2009): as I 
will detail in the fourth and fifth section, several populist projects precisely pursue the 
direct participation of their People, in order to diminish (and in some cases to completely 
fill) the gap between the representatives and the represented. Nor it is always true that 
“contemporary populism focuses primarily on the output and not on the input of democ-
racy” (Mudde 2004, 558): if it were so, some new, more “traditional” politicians advanc-
ing different political proposals could exploit the discontent, without recurring to the 
“populist toolkit”. 
As the “stylistic” approach stresses, an important feature of some populisms (and par-
ticularly of the “neopopulisms” of the Nineties) is the re-presentational leader’s function, 
in the sense that he “presented again” (Arditi 2007) the People in the government 
through presenting himself as “one of them”. The Berlusconi’s rhetoric centred on his 
economic success (the “self-made man”), or the “colourful” aspect and “out-of-place” 
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behaviour of leaders such as Menem and Bucaram, are just a few examples of the sym-
bolic and descriptive representation enacted by populist leaders. 
Descriptive representation is also central in those populisms highlighting the presence, 
in their electoral lists, of “common, ordinary people”, in contraposition of the “careerist 
politicians”. Through these elements of symbolic and descriptive representation, popu-
lisms can claim that they really “pursue the interests of the people”, by pretending to 
have a “common feeling” with the represented. Moreover, they often enact several 
mechanisms of direct and/or participative democracy, and can even be closer to the in-
troduction of an “imperative mandate” and of “revocatory tools”, thus contributing to 
the persistence of the “feedback loop” between the leader(s) and the people.  
Of course, it would be ingenuous to overlook the “manipulative” and opportunistic 
features of these practices, as well as the potentially very dangerous plebiscitarian di-
rection that populisms can (and often do) take. Nonetheless, populisms are not neces-
sarily against “representative democracy”: they are completely at odds with a formalistic 
understanding of representation. For populist leaders, parties, movements and voters, 
representative democracy must not be equated with the simple elections of their MPs 
every two, three or more years, waiting for the next elections in order to express a judge-
ment on their behaviours and eventually to punish them through the ballots.  
By strictly equating popular sovereignty with (more than merely formal) accountabil-
ity, populisms are likely to attack those governments perceived as “distant” and “tech-
nocratic” (as the EU institutions), often portraying them as “servants” of some obscure, 
economic elites. Supranational institutions are also criticised for their poor electoral le-
gitimacy, and for depriving the People of its sovereignty. The populist focus on the ver-
tical accountability (O’Donnell 1994) often leads to question the “impartiality” of the 
institutional checks and balances, although, depending on the political context, it is also 
possible to observe populist movements defending these institutions, when the target 
of the populists is a “corrupted political and economic elite” unaccountable to the Law. 
 
 
4. Looking at the “input”: the electoral/delegative populisms… 
 
The “stylistic” approach helps to go more deeply into the process of reproduction of 
populisms, and to problematize the “populist understanding” of the concept of repre-
sentation. However, this approach does not openly discuss the different forms that pop-
ulist phenomena assume in terms of organization and popular participation: this is the 
goal of the remaining sections. 
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A fundamental problem of the “inclusionary/exclusionary” dichotomy (Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2013) is its exclusive focus on the outputs (such as the political pro-
grams or the policies implemented) delivered by the populisms, and their consequences 
(usually assumed as dangerous) on the quality of democracy, by evaluating how unsus-
tainable expansionary policies (in the case of “inclusionary” populism), xenophobic ap-
peals (in the case of the “exclusionary” one) or a “decisionist” policy-making style (in 
both cases) harm the liberal-democratic institutions.  
An analysis of the deficiencies of specific liberal democratic regimes has often (and 
rightly) helped to understand the conditions leading to the emergence of populist phe-
nomena. For example, Morgan (2011), in her analysis of the “party systems’ collapses”, 
mainly points on the incapacity of the existing parties of renewing their linkages with 
several social sectors, due to exogenous factors (such as economic crisis and interna-
tional policy constraints) and endogenous ones (such as the existence of interparty 
agreements and organizational constraints).  
Nonetheless, the populisms do not just promise an “easy solution” for these “dis-
eases”. They firstly provide a diagnosis, always centred on the way the “elites” manage 
politics and on the insufficient influence of the People, thus calling for restoring the pop-
ular sovereignty against the privileged sectors. The populisms, therefore, are highly at-
tentive to improve the input side of the democratic processes as a necessary condition 
for changing the outputs. An alternative way of categorizing populism is to classifying it 
according to the prognoses provided, i.e. to the specific way used for “shortening the 
distances between the legitimate authority and the people” (Ostiguy 2014, 20). 
To pursue this goal, the populisms advance different, and often contradictory, solu-
tions. The legitimate authorities could be inattentive to the “real problems” of the “com-
mon people” because of the “privileges” they enjoy thanks to their socioeconomic con-
dition, because of their closeness to some economic élites having a disproportionate in-
fluence on the policy-making process, because they belong to a “caste” more interested 
in the defence of their “privileges” than in offering solutions, or because the government 
has its hands tied by the multiple institutional “checks and balances” (often “occupied” 
by some, obscure “elites”) preventing it from advancing an efficacious activity, among 
other things.  
One “solution” could lie in delegating to a leader the management of the State, by 
limiting (and attacking) the influence of the institutional “checks and balances”. This 
leader, consequently, would embody the “popular”, “general will”, against the multiple 
“inertial” points of resistance of those sectors favouring the status quo. Typically, the 
leader will establish direct, charismatic linkages with her/his People, through particular 
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styles or “ways to manage politics”, and will be legitimized to exert the authority by the 
“power of the numbers” and by the pretension to be “one of the People”. 
Differently from a purely authoritarian solution, the electoral-delegative populisms 
tend to multiply the instances of electoral legitimacy of its power. The leader will show 
a particular attention to the opinion polls, in order to avoid losing the “contact” with the 
People. Some instances of direct (or plebiscitarian) democracy will be possibly enacted, 
particularly (but not necessarily) when in opposition, to “give the Voice to the People” – 
and, admittedly, to “avoid the blame” for taking unpopular measures. At the same time, 
because of her/his pretension to “embody the popular will”, the leader will flaunt a “de-
cisionist” style to deal with the problems s/he is supposed to fix, dismissing the institu-
tions devoted to the “horizontal accountability”, portraying them as useless “brakes” for 
her/his governmental action and as “enclaves” occupied by the old élites. 
It is clear that this electoral and delegative populism is well described by scholars such 
as Mudde, Weyland (as “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from unor-
ganized numbers”) and Pappas (as “democratic illiberalism”). Several historic political 
phenomena can be included in this typology, such as the “neopopulisms” of the Nineties, 
the Western European populist right and the ongoing presidency of Donald Trump. In all 
of these political experiences, the leader embodies, more than representing, her/his 
People, belonging to a socially constructed “heartland” (Taggart, 2000), typically op-
pressed by high taxation, menaced by immigrant people – who supposedly put in perils 
the People’ rights – or unrepresented by other structures of interest representation, 
such as the unions, alleged of defending corporatist rights in detriment of the “working 
People”.  
In this sense, I prefer identifying in the “privileged sectors”, and not just in the “elites”, 
the enemies contrasted by the populist phenomena. According to the storytelling of 
leaders such as Berlusconi or Menem, the problems of the country relied on the “over-
protection” enjoyed by some sectors, who led to excessive public expenditure, high un-
employment rates or recurrent hyperinflations. According to the radical right rhetoric, 
the cosmopolitan elites “overprotect” the migrant people, who enjoy a “privileged” ac-
cess to the welfare resources in detriment of the natives (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2013).  
It should be noticed that the neopopulists aimed at “depoliticizing” their societies by 
calling for “efficient”, market-friendly measures in order to allow the People for a full 
dedication to the private sphere. The same can be said of the populist right, although, in 
order to achieve this goal, the means are quite different: the populist radical rights see 
the main problem in the loss of the national sovereignty, calling for a restoration of the 
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power of the nation state, in detriment of the “technocratic elites”. In fact, several radi-
cal right parties – such as the Northern League, the UKIP, the Front National or the Swiss 
UDC - campaign for a stronger use of the direct democracy’s tools in order to challenge 
the elites’ decisions. In this sense, they do call for a limited mobilization and politicization 
of their People, fully restricted to the voting sphere.  
It would be a mistake to equate the electoral-delegative populism with the exclusion-
ary ones. In Latin America, we observed the rising of left-wing leaders such as Chávez 
and his Bolivarian Revolution and Correa and his Citizen Revolution. The technocratic 
features of Correa’s governments have been widely noticed (Becker 2013; Collins 2014), 
as well as the difficult relationship between Correa and the lively Ecuadorean social 
movements, who strongly oppose the extractivist and developmentalist strategy of the 
former president. Similarly, it would be very difficult to consider the emergence of the 
Chavism as a “participative” experience, albeit its (fulfilled) promise of implementing 
participative and direct democracy’s tools in a new Constitution. Instead, Chávez repre-
sented the “strong man” coming from the army who would have ended with the Vene-
zuelan partidocracia and installed a government truly responsive to the “general will of 
the People”. As Roberts (2007) noticed, the strong popular mobilization and organization 
fostered by Chávez came in a secondary moment and responded to the necessity of 
building a “popular power” in order to counterbalance the economic and institutional 
resources of the Venezuelan “old order” aiming at stopping the Bolivarian project. 
 
 
5. … and the participative-mobilising populisms 
 
Instead of delegating the political decisions to a “strong leader”, many populisms ad-
vance very different proposals in order to correct the inadequacies of the existing rep-
resentative democracies. These populisms also point their finger at the unaccountability 
of the representatives, albeit for very different reasons. They often consider the MPs as 
a “political caste” enjoying strong privileges that prevent them from really understand-
ing what happens in the pays réel. Accusations of corruptions are common. Crucially, 
MPs are often alleged of “betraying” the popular mandate, because of their closeness to 
“powerful, privileged sectors or elites”, because of being part of the “establishment”, 
and because of their frequent “transformism”, i.e. their passing from a parliamentary 
group to another one or from supporting different governments during a legislative man-
date. All of these critiques concern the lack of control of the People towards their repre-
sentatives/delegates in the public offices. Nonetheless, the solution would consist in the 
direct occupation of the public institutions by the People, thus leading its mobilization 
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and pushing for its direct involvement in the political decisions. I define this populist 
subtype as participative-mobilising populism. 
Analytically distinct, but often empirically linked with those accusations, is the com-
mon dissatisfaction against the “political parties” that populisms both represent and 
contribute to foster. “Mainstream” political parties are seen as self-referential organiza-
tions that do not provide a satisfactory channel for the participation of the citizens in the 
political realm, being, in turn, more attentive to accede to the public economic re-
sources. The “cartelization” of the political parties (Katz and Mair, 1995) has triggered a 
growing popular dissatisfaction against them, whereas several, well-known macro-phe-
nomena (such as the decline of the mass party organizations and party membership, the 
“disenfranchisement” of broad social sectors from the previous partisan alignments, the 
decline of political participation, particularly among younger strata, among other things) 
contribute to delegitimize the “traditional” political parties. 
The participative-mobilising populist projects often look more similar to a social move-
ment than to a political party. They call for a “genuine popular participation”, around 
specific issues or “flags”, and struggle for the re-appropriation of the public institutions. 
They call for a re-politicization of the society, relying on an antagonistic frontier between 
“Us” and “Them”, and claim for the necessity of a strong popular mobilization in order 
to oppose the “elites” and the “privileged sectors” favoured by the status quo. Far from 
exhausting their battle in the electoral arena, they call for a “popular resurrection” in 
order to “decide from below” and to “closely control the institutions”. As almost all the 
populist phenomena – with the possible exception of the “neopopulisms” – they aim at 
restoring the popular sovereignty of the People through the empowerment of the nation-
State, identifying the locus of the power in the public institutions. They are fully aware 
of the centrality of the “national battlefield”, as well as of the necessity of relying on 
“national signifiers” in order to build new, enduring and encompassing collective identi-
ties. 
This is not to deny the function carried on by the leaders of populist movements and 
parties. Nonetheless, the same leader’s actions can be “shaped from below” thanks to 
the mobilization of particular sectors forming part of the heterogeneous coalition built 
by her/him. The perfect example of this dynamic is the historical functioning of the clas-
sic Peronist movement, whose leader was very differently “interpreted” by its multiple 
factions, each of them attempting at influencing Perón (and his successors) by showing 
their mobilising power whenever it was possible. The leader, thus, acts as a “decider of 
last resort” between the different factions within the movement, and becomes his/her-
self as the central “battlefield” that each faction aims at occupying in order to lead the 
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movement towards the preferred direction. Probably, the most important function car-
ried on by the leader is to prevent that the internal divisions and struggles would trans-
late into a conflict over the leadership of the movement, irreversibly fracturing it. 
At the same time, it is impossible to deny that this participative-mobilizing populist 
subtype often shows top-down, even “militarised” forms of popular mobilizations. The 
leader often pretends discipline and dedication to the Cause from her/his People, thus 
leading towards potentially totalitarian directions. The Bolivarian Circles and their in-
volvement in the anti-poverty programs known as Missions in the Chavista populism 
represent well-known examples (Hawkins 2009). Nonetheless, in several other popu-
lisms (and even in Chavism), certain (and sometimes very strong) forms of spontaneous 
consolidation of grass-roots movements emerge. These grassroots can display poor hor-
izontal and vertical coordination, particularly during the inception phase of a populist 
movement, and, in fact, this “institutional disorder” is functional to a rapid diffusion of 
the movement. The usually lesser costs to join the movement are likely to attract higher 
memberships than the “traditional” political parties, where the barriers to entry and the 
internal stratifications and hierarchies are stronger. 
 
 
6. Four cases of (Anti-Neoliberal) Participative-Mobilising Populisms 
 
The Bolivian MAS-IPSP (“Movement Towards Socialism – Political Instrument for the 
Sovereignty of the People”), the Argentine Kirchnerism, the Spanish Podemos and the 
Italian Five Star Movement (M5S) represent contemporary examples of participative-
mobilizing populisms. All these political projects emerged in the aftermath of a deep 
crisis of the neoliberal model and denounced the loss of popular (and national) sover-
eignty in their democratic regimes, promising its restoration. They have advanced a po-
larising political discourse, drawing a clear boundary between the People and its Ene-
mies, which include supranational and international financial institutions, multinational 
corporations and their “representatives” at the national level.  
All of them clearly called for the active participation of their People in their projects, 
instead of simply asking for their support through the ballots. In all of them, a certain 
degree of hierarchization and power centralization coexists with strong instances of 
grass-roots participation and involvement in the decision-making process. Said this, 
these political projects stemmed from very different social and political contexts and 
their internal organization strongly vary.  
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The MAS-IPSP was created in 1995, as an “organic decision” of the main Bolivian peas-
ant and coca-grower unions and social movements. According to the well-known Pane-
bianco’s (1988) typology, it is an example of “externally legitimated party”, as it is con-
ceived as a “political instrument” of the founder organizations in order to run electorally 
and elect their representatives in the institutions. The process of candidates’ selection 
at all the levels should be entirely delegated to the social movements, through multi-
tiered internal elections; in fact, at least since the decision of reserving some posts to 
“invitees” figures (typically technocrats and intellectuals closer to the project) in order 
to expand the party’s support in the urban areas, the leader Evo Morales and his inner 
circle have acquired a growing (albeit not unlimited) decisional power even in this issue 
(Anría 2014; interview with Marité Zegada). The decision of creating their own “political 
instrument” stemmed from the necessity of stopping the successful attempts of co-op-
tation of the movements’ leaders by the “neoliberal parties” that dominated the cen-
tripetal Bolivian party system during the so-called “Pacted Democracy” (interviews with 
Juana Quispe – President of the MAS-IPSP parliamentary group – and with Juan de la 
Cruz – one of the MAS-IPSP’s founders).  
For the sake of space, it is not possible here to describe the extremely complex history 
of the long Bolivian contentious phase, which lasted at least twenty years (since 1990 
until 2010), conducing to the democratic election of the historical MAS-IPSP’s leader Evo 
Morales (a cocalero peasant) to the national presidency in 2005. The MAS-IPSP became 
the Bolivian hegemonic party mainly due to the strong territorial control by the peasant 
unions, which are powerful organizations of small landowners that, apart from struggling 
for channelling public resources in developmentalist projects, advancing with the Agrar-
ian Reform, defending the recognition of cultural rights, are also involved in quasi-judi-
ciary decisions, compelling for all of their members and taken in a deliberative way. The 
Bolivian social movements showed both very high mobilising skills and the ability of es-
tablishing alliances with several other local or sectorial actors emerging during the Nine-
ties against the neoliberal government of that time (interviews with Eduardo Córdova 
and Fernando Mayorga). In particular, the coca-growers’ unions, menaced by the coca 
eradication programs violently implemented by the Bolivian army and by its US allies, 
played an important role during the uprising in Cochabamba against the privatization of 
the local water company (2000), while both the Highlands unions and the coca-growers 
actively participated in the violent protest in La Paz and El Alto against the selling of the 
Bolivian gas to Chile (2003), leading to the resignation of the right-wing president 
Sánchez de Losada. Although the MAS-IPSP has opened to the participation of many 
other grass-roots organizations (such as the industrial and mineworkers’ unions, the 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 10(2) 2017: 517-543,  DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v10i2p517 
  
532 
 
miners organized through cooperatives, the urban vendors’ and transport workers’ un-
ions, the Highlands and Lowlands indigenous organizations, all of which form part of the 
ruling social coalition), the “political instrument” is still dominated by the founders’ or-
ganizations, the so-called trillizas2 and the coca-grower unions. It is common to hear 
from the own MAS-IPSP’s leaders that the party “does not exist”, being a mere political 
brand in order to run electorally (interviews with the MAS-IPSP’s MP Manuel Canelas 
and with the Vice-Presidency officers Juan Pinto), as the “real power” belongs to the 
social movements. 
Fully in line with the well-known motto Ruling by Obeying, the social movements’ ba-
ses intend their representatives as mere “speakers” of their (both sectorial and territo-
rial) constituencies (interview with the MAS-IPSP’s MP Martiriano Mamani). At the same 
time, they are expected to faithfully obey to their government, which, notwithstanding 
the “participative”, bottom-up rhetoric, keep the initiative power under the unchal-
lenged leadership of Evo Morales (interviews with Juana Quispe and with the MAS-IPSP’s 
MP Shirley Suarez). Nonetheless, it would be a big mistake to downplay the power of the 
social movements, which increasingly act as corporatist organizations struggling for the 
access to the public resources, while the President acts as a “decider of last resort” of 
the multiple and contrasting demands. The Bolivian system of interest intermediation 
under the masistas governments must be understood as a complex “chamber of com-
pensation” between the contrasting demands of the heterogeneous – and well-organ-
ised – social sectors taking part in the Process of Change.  
The “anticolonial”, anti-imperialist and “indigenous-communitarian” discourse of the 
origins has been gradually substituted by a statist, developmentalist project aiming at 
fostering economic growth and investing in vast social and development programs. The 
old pluralist, neoliberal (as well as clientelistic and corrupted) regime has thus been sub-
stituted by a statist-corporatist one, in which the old clientelistic networks – particularly 
in the urban centres – are now exploited by the ruling party, whereas the different or-
ganizations aligned with the government are often involved in opaque negotiations. 
Nonetheless, the mobilising capacity of the different social movements is still very high, 
and can be used as a resource for the negotiations within the ruling coalition, but also in 
order to back the governmental campaigns. 
If the masista experience is, at least in its origins, a purely bottom-up process, the 
same cannot be said about the Argentine Kirchnerism. Néstor Kirchner reached the pres-
idency when the “Argentine unemployed people outnumbered his voters”, as it is often 
remarked. Back then he was a poorly known governor of a remote Southern Argentine 
 
2 The trillizas (‘triplets’) are the CSUTCB (the Peasant Federation), the CSCIOB (the Rural Settlers’ Federa-
tion) and the ‘Bartolinas’ (the Women Peasant Federation).  
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Province: he could win thanks to the endorsement by the exiting President, the right-of-
center Peronist Duhalde, who chose to support him in order to prevent his archrival (and 
former President) Carlos Menem from winning the elections (Ostiguy 2005). Argentina 
was still trapped into a dramatic economic crisis, which provoked, among other things, 
an unprecedented unemployment rate, the default of its public debt and a drastic con-
traction of its GDP.  
Social unrests were shocking the country since the mid- Nineties, when several move-
ments, mostly formed by unemployed and public sector workers enrolled in radical un-
ions, began organising road-blockages (piquetes) and popular uprisings (puebladas) 
throughout numerous provinces, firstly in the Interior and then in the Buenos Aires’ Prov-
ince (PBA), demanding the reversal of the austerity measures and the distribution of un-
employment subsidies (planes) (Pereyra and Svampa 2003). The unrests extended to the 
middle class sectors when the centrist President De La Rúa opted for freezing the bank 
accounts (the infamous corralito) as a desperate defence of the dollarization of the econ-
omy. The result was the generalised and cross-class violent riots that forced De La Rúa 
to flee the Presidential Palace (December, 2001), an institutional crisis symbolised by the 
alternation of five Presidents in fifteen days and, finally, the interim Presidency of the 
former PBA’s governor Duhalde. The Duhalde’s term lasted just fourteen months and 
was characterised by a timid economic recovery and by persistent road-blockages or-
ganised by numerous piqueteros’ groups, demanding jobs and the administration of the 
planes, in competition with the extended Peronist clientelistic machine.  
 In this unpromising scenario, Kirchner began a polarizing, nacional y popular dis-
course, claiming against the “old political class”, “neoliberalism” and the “Fatherlands’ 
enemies”, putting in the same box the neoliberal governments of the Nineties and the 
reactionary military dictatorship of the 1976-1983 period. Concretely, he adopted a 
tougher stance and an anti-imperialist rhetoric towards the international economic in-
stitutions and the country creditors. At the same time, he began working for the prose-
cution of the army’s officers involved in the human rights’ violations during the Argen-
tine dictatorship. Kirchner called for the recuperation of the traditional Peronist goals 
(“Economic Independency”, “Political Sovereignty” and “Social Justice”), claiming for the 
consolidation of a “National Capitalism” and dialoguing with the bulk of the piquetero 
sectors and with both the “mainstream” and “dissident” Argentine labor movements 
(interviews with Carlos Sánchez – leading figure in the Federación Tierra y Vivienda 
movement – and with Héctor Cabrera – member of the Central Committee of the Central 
de los Trabajadores de Argentina). At the same time, he did not definitively break with 
the “Peronist old guard”, being able to conduct the majority of the Peronist politicians 
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to his side, “freeing” himself from Duhalde’s control and leaving him in an isolated posi-
tion. The least voted President of the Argentine democracy soon was able to inaugurate 
the most stable governmental “era” in the modern times. 
Kirchner’s main ability was to present himself as a progressive figure – thus attracting 
vast middle class sectors, also thanks to the rapid economic recovery, as a product of his 
heterodox measures – and to retain the traditional Peronist popular constituencies (and, 
crucially, the majority of the Peronist local leaders). At the same time, he was able to 
incorporate (even offering governmental posts) into his coalition the most “dialoguist” 
social movements’ and unions’ leaders, through both programmatic and clientelistic ex-
changes (Boyanovski 2010; interview with Fernando Esteche – Leader of the Movimiento 
Popular Quebracho, a far-left Peronist group). These organizations soon would have 
formed the true “social bases” of the Kirchnerist project, i.e., its most faithful allies (in-
terview with Sebastián Etchemendy, former officer in the Minister of Labour). This would 
have been evident during the so-called Conflicto del Campo (2008), which saw the gov-
ernment of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner opposed to the big rural landowners (backed 
by the political opposition) around the governmental attempt to raise the fiscal imposi-
tion of the soybeans’ exports (Boyanovski 2010).  
The long Kirchners’ political era (under Néstor until 2007, and under Cristina until 
2015) has been labelled by Arzadún (2013) as the “triumph of the politics over the eco-
nomics”. This implied the incorporation of the social movements (Rossi, 2015) into the 
polity domain, the empowerment of the bargaining power of the unions (Etchemendy 
and Collier, 2007), and, more generally, the introduction of a statist, anti-neoliberal eco-
nomic project. At the same time, the government (particularly during Cristina’s term) 
often resorted to the active mobilisation of its followers in order to show the popular 
support for its political campaigns. The Argentine political climate of the Nineties could 
be resumed by the title of the famous Martuccelli and Svampa’s (1997) book, “Empty 
Squares”, referring to the clientelistic and demobilising tactics adopted by the Peronist 
party under Menem (Levitsky 2003) and to the social disarticulation brought by neolib-
eralism. In turn, the Kirchnerism decisively contributed to the re-politicization of the Ar-
gentine society. Kirchners’ governments provided multiple points of access to the polity 
domain to those movements’ and unions’ leaders willing to support the project, through 
a combination of progressive measures and traditional clientelism. In sum, it was a top-
down political project, in which the grass-roots mobilization fulfilled two basic functions: 
to support the Leader against the political attacks from the opposition, and to defend 
the influence achieved by the movements into the decision-making process. The mobi-
lising features were surely not restricted to the electoral moment, although, differently 
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from the Bolivian case, the “participative” element did not extend to the candidates’ 
selection process, which remained confined to the decisions of the party’s apparatus.  
The two Southern European instances of participative-mobilising populism have 
erupted in the middle of the Great Recession. Podemos and the M5S merge a populist 
discourse, dividing the society into a “corrupt elite” and a “virtuous and exploited Peo-
ple”, with a strong call for the active participation of the citizens in the public sphere. At 
the same time, both parties rely on a strong, if very different, leadership, representing 
the most visible “face” or “voice”. Nonetheless, the differences between these two phe-
nomena surely outnumber the similarities. 
The theoretical definitions of populism by Mudde and Weyland help to capture some 
traits of the M5S’ experience. Its pretension to represent the “general will of the People” 
(with possible clashes with a pluralist Weltanschauung) clearly emerges from statement 
like this: “You asked me if we opened ourselves to the “civil society” [during the process 
of the formation of the first electoral lists for the Sicilian elections]. Well, we did not need 
to do that, because we are the civil society” (Giancarlo Cancelleri, M5S’ candidate for the 
Sicilian governorship in 2013, my interview). At the same time, the relationship between 
the founder and leader (the “guarantor” of the Movement, or the “megaphone” of the 
activists) Beppe Grillo and his followers is surely an unmediated and uninstitutionalized 
one, as Weyland puts. Nonetheless, an analysis of the M5S’ experience based exclusively 
on these aspects would be limited.  
The M5S puts a strong emphasis on the active participation of its activists in important 
activities such as the elaboration of the political programs and the selection of the par-
tisan candidacies. Moreover, it stresses the centrality of the party-on-the-ground, which 
must primarily focus on territorial issues in a strongly autonomous way. It is precisely 
the peculiar internal organization, and its evolution through “diffusion” more than 
through “penetration” (Panebianco 1988), that allowed the M5S to present itself as a 
heterogeneous “aggregator of unsatisfied demands” (to use the Laclau’s jargon) at the 
national and local level, often working side-by-side with local movements (Mosca 2014). 
Similarly to the MAS-IPSP, the M5S advances a drastic critique of the representative de-
mocracy per se, defending the introduction of an imperative mandate for their “speak-
ers”, i.e. the party’s representatives in the public institutions.  
One obvious difference is that, while the MAS-IPSP is conceived as the instrument of 
the organised bases, the M5S’ are expected to fully adhere to the political program (“our 
Bible”, as several interviewees defined it), whose legitimacy derives from the “constitu-
ent power” of the (individual) citizens. Similarly, the M5S often claims for having con-
tributed to strengthen the descriptive representation of the Italian Parliament, through 
the election of “ordinary People” (gente comune). There is, here, some (vague) parallels 
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with the changes provoked by the irruption of the MAS-IPSP, although this party cor-
rected the “White bias” in the Bolivian institutions through the inclusion of the delegates 
of its indigenous, peasant and corporatist organizations into the electoral lists. 
Of course, this would be an ingenuous and idyllic portrait of the concrete functioning 
of the M5S. Its detractors rightly underscore, among other things, the power asymmetry 
between the leader and the bases and the resource owned by the former in order to 
“address” the internal debates towards already established positions (Tronconi 2015). 
According to an insider such as the former M5S’ MP Zaccagnini (my interview), the own 
creation of the current “party’s elite” clearly responded to a top-down process of selec-
tion of the most “faithful” followers of the leadership among the elected representatives 
of the Movement. Nonetheless, what is more relevant for this paper is the insufficient 
description of this political project as “focused primarily on the output and not on the 
input of democracy”. 
Podemos, in this sense similarly to Kirchnerism, does not attack representative de-
mocracy per se, instead attacking the “political and economic caste” that ruled in Spain 
since its transition to democracy. The rising of Podemos would be unconceivable without 
taking into account the Indignados (Hughes 2011) assembly-based movement (popularly 
known as 15-M) and the following Mareas protesting against the cuts on public spending 
implemented by the right-of-center governments. The 15-M movement, in particular, 
represented a highly spontaneous mobilization organized through the web-based cam-
paign Real Democracy Now!. The 15-M attacked the self-referential political system and 
the loss of popular sovereignty due to the domination of the international capital, as the 
famous slogan “We are not goods at disposal to politicians and bankers!” summarized.  
Podemos does not aspire to represent the 15-M, and does not conceive itself as the 
“political instrument” of any social movements. Nonetheless, the “hypothesis” that led 
a few political scientists to the decision of creating a political party was based on the 
change in the Spanish political environment by the protest cycle inaugurated by the 
demonstrations in the Puerta del Sol square. Said otherwise, Podemos represents the 
attempt of bringing into the institutions the main demands of several horizontal move-
ments such as the 15-M, the Mareas or the PAHs (Platforms of the Victims of Banks’ 
Evictions), which achieved a strong resonance in the public sphere. The “hypothesis Po-
demos” relied on the belief that the public institutions and the own nation-State still 
keep an extraordinary potential for promoting social change, notwithstanding its power 
erosion and transfer to supranational and financial institutions (Errejón and Mouffe 
2015). 
Almost all the Podemos’ leading figures, both at the national and regional levels, have 
an academic and/or militant background. Even at the grassroots levels, and differently 
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from the M5S, the double militancy (in the party and in civic associations or social move-
ments) is majoritarian, according to the interviews I collected in different Podemos’ Ter-
ritorial Circles in Barcelona and Madrid and with several Podemos’ members of regional 
parliaments.  
Said this, the Podemos’ project is mostly a top-down one. Since its origins it was cen-
tred on the charismatic and media-friendly figure of Pablo Iglesias, whose face repre-
sented the first party’s brand in the electoral ballots for the 2014 European Parliamen-
tary Elections. At the First Citizens’ Assembly (i.e., the Party’s Congress) held in Vistalegre 
(October, 2014), the party adopted a strongly hierarchical organogram, in order to build 
a smooth and efficient “electoral war machine” instead of a more horizontal internal 
organization. For sure, each internal office must be elected through the vote of the 
party’s members. The low barriers to membership and the use of on-line voting proce-
dure allow for high levels of participation of the bases. Moreover, Podemos, similarly to 
the M5S, strongly relies on the social media for its communicative strategy, and it has 
created several web-based tools in order to allow its membership for advancing legisla-
tive and programmatic proposals, although the relevance of these initiatives have re-
mained quite limited. 
Nonetheless, the party’s elite (the inner circle led by the Podemos’ founders) opted 
for a procedural voting system favouring the victory of “its” candidates in the elections 
for the Citizens’ Congress (i.e., the Party’s internal “Parliament”). At the same time, the 
elections for the main offices at the regional level saw the victory (with some exceptions) 
of those lists that received the “endorsement” of the national Directive Committee, thus 
increasing the “homogeneity” of the party’s elites throughout all the different levels (in-
terviews  with Rodrigo Amírola – Member of the Podemos’ Political Secretary – and with 
Luís Alegre – Former Podemos’ Political Secretary in Madrid). Since the promising results 
achieved in the European Parliamentary Elections, the number of the Podemos’ Circles 
(i.e., partisan sections, territorially or issue-based, which do not require to be a Po-
demos’ member in order to join in) skyrocketed: nonetheless, the centralising process 
for the local elites’ selection approximates the construction of its organization to a pro-
cess of territorial penetration more than diffusion, to use Panebianco’s terminology. In 
turn, the Circles have seen their relevance diminished, as their militants do not enjoy 
more “voice” in the Podemos’ internal functioning than the “on-line” members of the 
party.  
This potential lack of incentives to the off-line participation has been partially ad-
dressed through the implementation of the party’s program Impulsa, which provides fi-
nancial resources for the social, political and cultural initiatives organised by the Circles 
(interview with Sergio Arroyo – Member of the Podemos’ Secretary of Participation). 
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Moreover, during the lively internal debate for the internal electoral campaign for the 
Second Citizens’ Assembly (held in Vistalegre on February, 2017), it emerged the idea of 
strengthening the Circles through the destination of financial resources, in order to help 
building, thanks to the activities at the grassroots levels and in collaboration with the 
movements, that National and Popular Movement that Podemos aspire to be. 
Therefore, in Podemos coexists a typically populist, polarising and interclassist rheto-
ric against the “political and economic caste”, a strong leadership and a lively bottom-
up participation of the bases. The Municipalist Platforms joined by Podemos that rule in 
Barcelona, Madrid and several other Spanish cities make the aspiration of facilitating the 
active citizens’ involvement in the decision-making process even clearer. Once again, an 
understanding of populism as a corrective of the representative democracy based on 
“enhanced accountability rather than increased participation” proved to be insufficient 
to understand several, contemporary populist phenomena.  
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks: The Populist (and Citizenist) Re-Politicization 
 
All the instances of participative-mobilising populisms briefly discussed above stem 
from socioeconomic and political contexts that favoured their emergence. The crisis of 
the Washington Consensus hegemony in Latin America at the end of the Nineties and 
the Great Recession in Southern Europe, as well as the attempts of addressing both cri-
ses through orthodox (i.e., responding to the neoliberal “single thought”) economic 
measures, nurtured popular reactions that provided the “political opportunity structure” 
for the emerging of participative-mobilising populist phenomena. They show a “majori-
tarian pretension” of “truly representing” the People, against those political elite that 
“sold” their public institutions to the economic ones and contributed to the power shift 
from the nation-State to obscure supranational and financial institutions.  
Nonetheless, most of the contemporary populisms seem closer to the “electoral-del-
egative” pole. The electoral-delegative populisms stress the symbolic representation 
provided by a charismatic leader, who, moreover, pretends to act “in behalf of” his/her 
People and promises to “fix” the problems caused by the “old regime”. In this sense, the 
restoration of the centrality of the nation-State is functional to give to the leader those 
power resources deliberately assigned by the “old regime” to some obscure suprana-
tional forces unaccountable to the People. Nonetheless, the People does not expect to 
be involved in the detailed management of the res publica: it just asks for a government 
respondent to its “general will”.  
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This could surely lead to anti-pluralist directions, to portray as “privileged sectors” all 
the dissonant voices and to enter in collision with the institutional checks and balances. 
Nonetheless, and differently from the classic totalitarian regimes, the final goal is to al-
low the “common people” to improve their living conditions in their private sphere: in 
this sense, it could be said that even the re-politicisation that electoral-delegative popu-
lisms advance is functional to a subsequent de-politicisation, similarly to the ideological 
project of the “neo-populists” of the Nineties.  
In contrast, those populisms closer to the “participative-mobilising” pole aims at po-
liticising the public decisions both at the local and national levels, through the recuper-
ation of the nation-State and the direct involvement of the citizens in the decision-mak-
ing process, thus trying to revert the process of social atomisation provoked by the ne-
oliberal hegemony. In the case of the M5S, nonetheless, the kind of participation pro-
moted is on an individual basis, thus conceiving itself as expression of the “general will” 
of the People. Podemos, in turn, has been able to position itself as a kind of “favourite 
interlocutor” for the antineoliberal social movements, defending its role as autonomous 
political actor. In both cases, the recurrent use of the concept of citizen shows the com-
mitment of these projects towards a sort of “informed activation” of the citizenship.  
In the Bolivian and Argentine cases, the incorporation of the People into the polity 
domain is achieved more through the intermediation of the popular social movements 
and organizations than on an individual basis. The concept of citizen is clearly substi-
tuted, in the MAS-IPSP and Kirchnerism rhetoric, by the concept of People(s) and Na-
tion(s), two collective ideas that must be intended in a communitarian and anti-imperi-
alist way, completely at odds with the individualistic ideological hegemony of the Nine-
ties and potentially less compatible with a liberal democratic regime (although they 
clearly represent democratic experiences). In my view, the enormous disparities in terms 
of resources, between the sociological profile of the M5S and Podemos’ activists and 
those forming the bulk of the MAS-IPSP and Kirchnerist electorates explain the different 
Weltanschauung and repertoires, between the Latin American populisms and the Euro-
pean citizenisms. 
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